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Abstract
Civil servants have a bad reputation of being lazy. However, citi-
zenspersonal experiences with civil servants appear to be signicantly
better. We develop a model of an economy in which workers di¤er in
laziness and in public service motivation, and characterise optimal in-
centive contracts for public sector workers under di¤erent informational
assumptions. When civil servantse¤ort is unveriable, lazy workers
nd working in the public sector highly attractive and may crowd out
workers with a public service motivation. When e¤ort is veriable, the
government optimally attracts motivated workers as well as the econ-
omys laziest workers by o¤ering separating contracts, which are both
distorted. Even though contract distortions reduce aggregate welfare,
a majority of society may be better o¤ as public goods come at a lower
cost.
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"Citizens and taxpayers have their own global view of bureaucracy. To
them, bureaucrats are lethargic, incompetent hacks who spend their days
spinning out reels of red tape and reams of paperwork, all the while going to
great lengths to avoid doing the job they were hired to do." James Q. Wilson
(1989), p. x.
1 Introduction
Bureaucrats have a bad reputation. Jokes about bureaucratslaziness and
stories on bureaucratic errors abound. The lack of monetary incentives at
public organisations is supposed to attract workers who are most averse to
exerting e¤ort. This pessimistic view is also prominent in the economics
literature. For several decades, the literature has identied bureaucrats as
pursuing their narrow self-interest, usually being at odds with the interest
of society (see Tullock, 1965, Downs, 1967, Niskanen, 1971, and Buchanan,
1978).
However, when citizens are asked for their personal experience with pub-
lic agencies, many tend to be satised with the performance of the agency.
Customersevaluation of a specic agency or civil servant is signicantly bet-
ter than their evaluation of the government or bureaucrats in general (Katz
et al., 1975, Goodsell, 1985). Hence, as Wilson (1989) phrases it: "...those
lazy, incompetent bureaucrats must work for some other agency..." (p. x).
This suggests that at least some civil servants do not t the stereotype.
It is also in line with a number of recent papers stressing the importance
of public service motivation for incentive schemes and workers e¤ort in
the public sector (Francois, 2000, Dixit, 2002, Delfgaauw and Dur, 2002b,
Prendergast, 2003, Glazer, 2004, Besley and Ghatak, 2004).
How to reconcile these seemingly opposing points of view? This paper
develops a model with three types of workers: regular, motivated, and lazy
workers. Compared to regular workers, lazy workers have higher cost of
e¤ort in both the private and the public sector. Motivated workers, to some
extent, enjoy exerting e¤ort in a public sector job, but are otherwise identical
to regular workers. This public service motivation gives monopsony power
to the government. We show that it is in the interest of a cost-minimising
government to attract, besides motivated workers, lazy workers rather than
regular workers.
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Whereas we model the private sector as a competitive market in which
workers are paid their full marginal product, the public sector is assumed to
be a single organisation whose objective is to produce a certain amount of
public goods at minimum cost. This organisation, which we refer to as the
public rm, attracts workers by o¤ering one or more contracts specifying the
wage and, if veriable, required e¤ort. The public rm can not observe the
workerstype and, hence, can not make the contracts contingent on worker
type. Workers choose the contract that yields them the highest utility,
provided that the private sector is not a better option.
We consider two cases: veriable and unveriable e¤ort. When e¤ort
is unveriable, the public rm prefers to attract either motivated or lazy
workers. We show that it may occur that the public rm prefers to attract
only motivated workers, but that it can not avoid hiring lazy workers as
well. However, if desired public production is su¢ ciently large, the public
rm wants to attract both motivated and lazy workers, implying that the
problem of nonexcludability of lazy workers is less severe.
When e¤ort is veriable and desired production in the public sector
is su¢ ciently small, the public rm attracts only motivated workers, and
extracts all motivational rents from these workers. This full rent extraction
may not be possible if a second worker type is needed. Any rents motivated
workers obtain when they would choose the other types contract can not
be extracted by the public rm. Since a contract satisfying a lazy workers
participation constraint has lower wage and lower required e¤ort than a
regular workers contract, a lazy workers contract is less appealing to the
motivated workers. Therefore, the public rm can extract more motivational
rents, and hence attracts motivated workers at lower cost, if it attracts lazy
workers rather than regular workers.
The public rm distorts both contracts in order to extract even more
motivational rents. It o¤ers lower-powered incentives to lazy workers than
do private rms. This way, the lazy workers contract becomes even less
appealing to the motivated workers. However, to keep production at the
desired level, this implies that the public rm has to hire additional lazy
workers, which is costly. These costs can be reduced by giving motivated
workers higher-powered incentives, above the level private rms would o¤er.
These contract distortions are cost-e¢ cient, but reduce social welfare. If
we impose that the public rm maximises social welfare rather than min-
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imises cost, it does not distort the contracts of the workers. Still, the public
rm prefers to attract motivated workers, but if a second worker type is
needed, it is indi¤erent between lazy and regular workers. Compared to a
cost-minimising public rm, social welfare is higher. However, total cost of
public goods production and, hence, taxes are also higher when the pub-
lic rm maximises social welfare. Only motivated workers benet, whereas
the utility of lazy and regular workers decreases as a result of higher taxes.
When motivated workers are a minority in society, politicians are likely to
strive for cost-minimisation rather than for social welfare maximisation, so
as to please the public at large.
While there has been quite some empirical research showing that a sig-
nicant part of the civil work force has a public service motivation,1 there
exists little evidence conrming the stereotype view that civil servants are
more averse to exerting e¤ort than workers in the private sector. Our model
implies that for lazy workers, the attractive feature of working in the public
sector is that the workload is relatively low, either because e¤ort is unveri-
able, or because weak incentives are provided. In 2002, the Dutch Ministry
of the Interior and Kingdom Relations undertook a survey of workers who
had recently entered or left the public sector. In Table 1, we list the per-
centage of workers moving between the private and the public sector who
mentioned workload as one of the three most important reasons to leave
their job. Workers who moved from the private sector to the public sec-
tor mention workload more often than workers who moved in the opposite
direction. The di¤erence is most pronounced for central government and
local governments. Education is the main exception. This may be due to
the shortage of teachers in The Netherlands, or it may indicate that our
model does not apply to all jobs in the public sector. If we restrict our sam-
ple to people who worked full-time at both jobs, the results provide even
stronger support for our predictions, at the expense of a smaller number of
observations.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section discusses how the
paper relates to the literature. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4
1Recent studies include Antonazzo et al. (2003) on nursing workers, Edmonds et al.
(2002) on teachers, and Frank and Lewis (2004) on employees in these and several other
areas of the public sector. These studies also indicate that there exists substantial variation
in occupational preferences among workers (see also Daymont and Andrisani, 1984, and
Harper and Haq, 2001)
3
Table 1: Percentage of workers moving from the private sector to
the public sector and vice versa who mention workload as one of
the three most important reasons to leave their job (The Nether-
lands, 2002).
Workload Respondents
Sector Inow Outow Inow Outow
Central 15.8 1.5 329 134
Local 16.3 7.4 681 267
Police 9.1 2.0 444 95
Research1 12.7 9.3 128 31
Hospitals2 11.0 12.9 40 46
Defence 3.2 4.6 159 107
Education 14.5 35.0 432 145
Data source: BZK, Mobiliteitsonderzoek 2002.
1 Research consists of universities and research institutes.
2 Only university hospitals are surveyed.
analyses the case where e¤ort in the public sector is unveriable. In Section
5, e¤ort is veriable in both sectors of the economy. Section 6 compares our
results with the case where the public rm maximises social welfare rather
than minimises costs. Section 7 concludes.
2 Related Literature
Our model is related to the literature on screening of workersability follow-
ing the seminal papers by Spence (1973) and Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976)
(for an overview, see Riley, 2001). In a standard adverse selection model
(see e.g. La¤ont and Martimort, 2002), a rm induces the low type to
exert a suboptimally low level of e¤ort, so as to extract more of the rents
from the hightype. The contract of the hightype is e¢ cient. In con-
trast, in our model the contracts of both types are distorted. Whereas in
the standard model a rm designs contracts for a xed number of workers,
our model describes the behaviour of a rm which has to meet a production
requirement.2
2 It is easy to extend our model to allow for price-elastic demand for the public good.
Then, as in the case of a production requirement, both contracts are distorted.
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Heterogeneity in laziness may stem from di¤erences in peoples physical
tness or ability, as in the standard adverse selection model, but may also
stem from heterogeneity in general work ethic or morale. Di¤erences in work
ethic have been associated with, for instance, personality traits (Furnham,
1992) and cultural factors (Hofstede, 1991). Caplan (2003) surveys the
modern personality psychology literature and concludes that: Some people
are much more eager to shirk than others by showing up late, spending their
e¤ort on non-work projects, taking their time, stealing o¢ ce supplies and
so on. Preferences for these sorts of behavior throughout the population
markedly di¤er, holding constraints constant.(p. 398).
A new strand in the economics literature emphasises that workers in
public organisations (or, more generally, in non-prot organisations) may
be intrinsically motivated to work. For instance, Dixit (2002) argues that
organisations that have an idealistic or ethical purpose may be attractive to
workers who share these goals. Besley and Ghatak (2004) show that, when
workers are protected by limited liability, a good match between an organ-
isations and a workers mission may reduce monetary incentives. Francois
(2000) and Glazer (2004) develop models where workers intrinsically value
the output of the public organisation, see also Preston (1989). In Ben-
abou and Tirole (2003) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2002a), workers may enjoy
exerting e¤ort at work or intrinsically value their contribution to output
(warm-glow). The main di¤erence between our paper and earlier work is
that we relax the assumption that types of agents are fully observed by the
principal.3
Most related to our work is a recent paper by Prendergast (2003). He as-
sumes that workers di¤er in altruism for clients. The government prefers to
attract di¤erent worker types for di¤erent agencies. For agencies where the
preferences of the government and clients are aligned, as in health care, the
government prefers the most altruistic bureaucrats. However, when the pref-
erences of the government and clients are not aligned, as with (suspected)
criminals, bureaucrats should be biased against their clients. Prendergast
3This paper builds on previous work. In Delfgaauw and Dur (2002a), we examine
the implications of workersintrinsic motivation for optimal monetary incentive schemes
and show that posting a higher wage increases the probability of lling the vacancy, but
decreases the expected quality of the hiree as less motivated workers are induced to apply.
In Delfgaauw and Dur (2002b), we analyse the consequences of deregulation of a sector
previously dominated by a public rm in a model where workers di¤er in their intrinsic
motivation to work in the sector.
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shows that, when agentstypes are unobservable, agencies are likely to at-
tract both the most preferred and the least preferred workers. The latter
enter the agency because they benet most from diverting from the govern-
ments most preferred policy.
Our work also relates to Lazear (1986). He argues that rms can use
their wage policy so as to attract certain types of workers, just like the public
rm in our model does. Strong monetary incentives induce highly productive
workers to apply at a rm, whereas less productive workers prefer a high base
salary and weak incentives (see also Lazear, 1995, and Prendergast, 1999,
for surveys). Moen and Rosen (2004) have recently built on this and argue
that, when there is a multi-tasking problem, competition between rms for
highly productive workers may result in too high-powered incentives from
a social welfare perspective. Burgess and Metcalfe (1999) show empirically
that private companies make far more use of incentive wages than public
organisations. Moreover, they argue that there are insu¢ cient grounds to
justify the low incentivisation of the public sector. Our model implies that
lazy workers get indeed weaker monetary incentives at the public rm com-
pared to the private sector, and suggests that this may be cost-e¢ cient. On
the other hand, motivated workers get stronger incentives.
A few papers consider heterogeneity in ability among government work-
ers in the context of downsizing the government (Jeon and La¤ont, 1999,
and Rama, 1999). Jeon and La¤ont (1999) show that the optimal voluntary
downsizing mechanism consists of a menu of public wages, severance pay, and
probabilities of dismissal. The governments choice which workers to retain
closely resembles our results in Section 6, where we impose that the govern-
ment maximises social welfare. When workers di¤er in a sector-specic trait,
the government prefers the workers that have a comparative advantage in
the public sector, whereas when workers di¤er in a general trait, the govern-
ment is indi¤erent. Our paper di¤ers in three important aspects. First, we
consider a model in which workers are heterogeneous both in general and
in sector-specic productivity, whereas Jeon and La¤ont study heterogene-
ity in general and in sector-specic productivity separately. We show that
heterogeneity in sector-specic motivation implies that a cost-minimising
government is not indi¤erent between workers who di¤er in general work
ethic. Second, in their model, e¤ort is xed, implying that they do not
consider optimal incentive schemes. Third, most of our analysis focuses
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on a cost-minimising government rather than a social welfare maximising
government.
3 The Model
There are two sectors in the economy, a private and a public sector. The
private sector is a fully competitive market where workers receive their full
marginal product. The public sector is run by a single entity, which can be
thought of as the government. This single organisation will be referred to
as the public rm. Both sectors have the same linear production function:
q(e) = e (1)
where q is production and e is e¤ort. Each unit of production of the private
sector can be sold on the world market for the exogenous price p. The
public rm produces public goods, which are therefore not priced. The
desired amount of public production is given by Q.4 First, we assume that
the public rm minimises cost of production. Next, we compare the results
with a social welfare-maximising public rm. We abstract from principal-
agent problems between voters, politicians, and managers of the public rm,
which implies that the objective of the public rm is in line with the interest
of (a majority of) the voters.
Three types of workers exist in the economy: regular workers r, moti-
vated workers m, and lazy workers l. The number of workers of each type in
the economy is given by Ni, i 2 fr;m; lg. Lazy workers incur a greater disu-
tility from working than the other worker types. Motivated workers derive
intrinsic utility from exerting e¤ort in the public sector, but are otherwise
identical to regular workers.5 Workers know their own type, but neither
private rms nor the public rm can observe worker types.
The utility of a worker of type i from working in the private sector is
given by:
Ui = w   iC(e) (2)
4Price-elastic demand for public goods would not alter any of the results qualitatively.
By varying the level of Q, our analysis yields the supply function for public goods. To-
gether, demand and supply then determine the optimal level of Q.
5Allowing for worker types with private sector motivation does not change the results,
as these workers would seek employment in the public sector only when wages in the public
sector are very high.
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where w is the wage, C(e) describes the cost of e¤ort, with properties C(0) =
0, C 0() > 0, and C 00() > 0, and i measures the degree of laziness. We
assume that 0 < r = m < l.
The utility of a worker of type i from working in the public sector is
given by:6
Ui = w + iV (e)  iC(e) (3)
where V (e) is a concave function with properties V (0) = 0, V 0() > 0 and
V 00() < 0, and i measures the public service motivation of a worker. We
assume that m > r = l = 0. Hence, only motivated workers derive
utility from exerting e¤ort in the public sector. Motivated workers have an
action-oriented motivation, as in Benabou and Tirole (2003) and Delfgaauw
and Dur (2002a, 2002b). Since q = e, results are the same if we assume that
motivated workers intrinsically value their contribution to output (warm-
glow), as in Besley and Ghatak (2004) and Glazer (2004).7 As motivated
workers derive motivational utility only at the public rm, the rm has
monopsony power over these workers.8
Competition in the private sector ensures that workers in the private
sector receive their full marginal product. Hence, total wage of a worker of
type i employed in the private sector is given by pei. It follows from (1) and
(2) that the optimal level of e¤ort ei of a worker of type i in the private
sector is implicitly given by:
C 0(ei ) =
p
i
(4)
The resulting level of utility is:
Ui = pe

i   iC(ei ) (5)
6We assume that workers are employed either in the private or in the public sector.
Allowing for part-time jobs in the private sector increases the distortions in the optimal
contracts when worker types are unobservable. We also abstract from subcontracting,
thereby ruling out that a motivated worker takes over the contracts of two or more lazy
workers at the public rm.
7 In contrast, Francois (2000) and Prendergast (2003) assume that workers have an
altruistic motivation, that is, workers care about the provision of public services, but do
not derive utility from their personal involvement in production.
8Allowing for a fourth type of worker, who derives motivational utility from working
in the public sector, but is lazy as well ( = m,  = l) does not a¤ect the results, unless
there are much more lazy motivated workers than regular motivated workers and m is
very low compared to l   r.
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Note that Ui is decreasing in i.
For future reference, we derive the level of e¤ort motivated workers would
exert in the private sector if they would have intrinsic motivation to work
in the private sector. This level of e¤ort, denoted by exm, is implicitly given
by:
C 0(exm) =
p+ mV
0(exm)
m
(6)
In the public sector, we distinguish two cases, veriable e¤ort and un-
veriable e¤ort. If e¤ort is veriable, the public rm o¤ers one or more
contracts in which both the level of e¤ort and the wage are specied. In the
second case, e¤ort (and output) is unveriable above a certain level of e, e.9
We assume that e is su¢ ciently small such that it is a binding restriction
for lazy and regular workers. This requires that e < el . Then, the public
rm can only o¤er a contract in which a wage level is specied, along with
the threat not to pay the wage if e¤ort is below e.
Wages in the public sector are nanced through a lump-sum (non-distortionary)
tax, uniformly levied on all workers in the economy. This implies that we
can ignore taxation when deriving the optimal occupational and e¤ort choice
of the workers.
4 Unveriable E¤ort in the Public Sector
We rst consider the case where in the public sector e¤ort levels above e are
unveriable. Hence, the best the public rm can do is to o¤er a contract
consisting of a wage which is only paid if the worker exerts at least e¤ort
level e. Clearly, lazy and regular workers never exert more e¤ort than e.
Motivated workers may decide to exert more e¤ort, which occurs when the
level of e¤ort em implicitly dened by rst-order condition
C 0(em) =
mV
0(em)
m
9 e reects that workers who do not show up at work or remain idle behind their desk
all day can be detected and are red. When e = 0, no extrinsic incentives can be provided,
implying that public goods production has to rely completely on intrinsic motivation.
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is greater than e. The minimum wage wi at which the public rm can attract
a worker of type i is given by the participation constraint:
wi = U

i + iC(ei)  iV (ei) (7)
where ei = e for lazy and regular workers. Using (5), we nd that for
non-motivated workers:
@wi
@i
= [p  iC 0(ei )]
@ei
@i
  C(ei ) + C(e) =  C(ei ) + C(e) < 0
where the rst term drops out using rst-order condition (4). The inequality
follows from the restriction e < ei . Hence, the public rm prefers lazy
workers to regular workers. Lazy workers value the relatively low level of
e¤ort in the public sector more than regular workers and, hence, demand
a lower wage. The same holds for motivated workers, but for a di¤erent
reason: They require a lower wage than regular workers, as they derive
motivational utility from working in the public sector. Moreover, motivated
workers may exert more e¤ort than regular workers, em  e.
Whether the public rm prefers motivated workers to lazy workers is
ambiguous. Motivated workers may exert more e¤ort and need less monetary
compensation for their e¤ort, but have higher opportunity cost of working
in the public sector than lazy workers. However, it is possible that the rm
prefers to attract only motivated workers, but that at the wage it has to o¤er
to attract them, lazy workers apply as well. In other words, lazy workers
may crowd out motivated workers in the public sector. This occurs when
wl=e > wm=em and wl < wm, where wi is dened by participation constraint
(7).10 Then, setting wm rather than wl is optimal if:
wl=e > wm
Nl +Nm
Nle+Nmem
where we assume that, when setting wm, the public rm randomly attracts
workers from the groups of motivated and lazy workers, and that utility
from public goods is linear. Hence, for a larger range of parameter values,
it is optimal to attract lazy workers only. With concave utility from public
goods, the condition becomes even more stringent as total public output
10 If the public rm could distinguish between worker types, this crowding out of moti-
vated workers would not occur, as contracts could be made contingent on type.
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becomes uncertain when the rm sets wm.
Crowding out of motivated workers may also happen when Q is su¢ -
ciently large, such that the public rm would like to attract all of the moti-
vated workers in the economy and a limited number of lazy workers. Then,
as the public rm can not distinguish between lazy and motivated workers,
some of the motivated workers may not obtain a public sector job.11
5 Veriable E¤ort
When e¤ort is veriable, the public rm optimally o¤ers one or more con-
tracts specifying a wage and a required level of e¤ort. Consider rst the
case where Q is su¢ ciently small, such that the rm needs only one worker
type. Given the type of worker, the optimal contract then minimises
Z =
X
i
wini (8)
with respect to ei, subject to the participation constraint (7) and the pro-
duction constraint Q = eini. This gives rst-order condition:

iC
0(ei)  iV 0(ei)
  Ui + iC(ei)  iV (ei)
ei

= 0 (9)
In the optimum, the marginal cost of e¤ort by the employed workers (the rst
term) is equal to the marginal cost of e¤ort by hiring an additional worker
(the second term). Using (4) and (5), it is easy to verify that condition (9)
is satised for lazy workers and for regular workers if ei = ei . Hence, if the
public rm chooses to hire lazy or regular workers, it induces them to exert
as much e¤ort as they do in the private sector. By (7), this implies that
the public rm has to pay them the same wage as they earn in the private
sector, pei . When we substitute em = e

m into equation (9) for i = m, we
nd, by using (4) and (5), that condition (9) is not satised, since:
 emmV 0(em) + mV (em) > 0
11 In Appendix A1 we prove that for each case considered in the main text, there ex-
ists a level of Q for which it is optimal for the public rm to attract two worker types
instead of one. When e¤ort is unveriable, the supply function of public goods displays
a discontinuous jump at this level of Q. When e¤ort is veriable, the supply function is
continuous but displays a kink at this level of Q.
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where the inequality follows from the concavity of V (e). Hence, motivated
workers are induced to exert less e¤ort than in the private sector, even
though their intrinsic motivation makes them willing to exert more e¤ort at
the same wage than in the private sector. The intuition is straightforward.
As the marginal rents from motivation of a single worker decrease in em, it
is optimal for the public rm to set em relatively low and attract additional
motivated workers. Thereby, the public rm increases the total rents from
motivation generated in the public sector, resulting in lower costs of public
goods production.12
Comparing the cost per unit of e¤ort for each worker type, it follows that
the public rm prefers to hire motivated workers. It has to pay lazy and
regular workers as much for their e¤ort as the private sector does, which
implies that total cost would be pQ. Even if the public rm would let
motivated workers work as hard as they do in the private sector, total cost
would be lower than pQ, namely pQ   nmmV (em), as the rm can fully
extract the rents from motivation. Since the rm optimally sets em < em,
it follows that total cost are even lower. Clearly, when the public rm o¤ers
the optimal contract to attract motivated workers, lazy and regular workers
have no incentive to opt for a public sector job.
Next, consider the case where Q is su¢ ciently large, such that two worker
types are needed. Still, the rm prefers to hire all of the motivated workers
as they are the only workers who are willing to work for less than p per
unit of e¤ort. The interesting question is which worker type the public rm
prefers to hire in addition to the motivated workers. Total cost Z is given
by:
Z = wmNm + wknk (10)
and the production constraint is given by:
emNm + eknk = Q (11)
where k 2 fr; lg. To attract and separate the two types, the rm creates
two contracts that meet the following conditions. First, the contracts must
meet the participation constraint of both types:
IRk wk   kC(ek)  Uk
12 It is easy to verify that if V (e) would be a linear function, the public rm optimally
sets em = em.
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IRm wm + mV (em)  mC(em)  Um
Second, the contracts must meet the revelation constraints, that is, each
worker must prefer the contract designed for his type to the other contract:13
ICk wk   kC(ek)  wm   kC(em)
ICm wm + mV (em)  mC(em)  wk + mV (ek)  mC(ek)
Consider rst the case where the public rm decides to attract motivated
and regular workers, k = r. This resembles a standard adverse selection
problem, where workers di¤er in their productivity inside the rm, but have
the same outside option (since r = m). As in the standard model, the
participation (or Individual Rationality) constraint of the low type and
the revelation (or Incentive Compatibility) constraint of the hightype are
binding, while the other two constraints are non-binding (see e.g. La¤ont
and Martimort, 2002, chapter 2). The optimisation problem of the public
rm is to minimise cost (10) with respect to em and er, subject to IRr, ICm,
and the production constraint (11). This gives the following two rst-order
conditions for em and er, respectively:
 Nm
er
[Ur + rC(er)] +Nm

mC
0(em)  mV 0(em)

= 0 (12)

errC
0(er)  Ur   rC(er)
 Q  emNm
e2r

+Nm

mV
0(er) + C 0(er)(r   m)

= 0
(13)
By substituting er = er into rst-order condition (13) and using (4) and (5),
the rst term drops out. Since the second term is positive, it follows that
the public rm induces the regular workers to exert less e¤ort than they do
in the private sector, er < er . Substituting this result into equation (12),
we nd that the contract for the motivated workers is also distorted. The
public rm induces the motivated workers to exert more e¤ort than they
13We assume that workers choose which contract to sign after applying. If a worker had
to choose for which contract to apply, motivated workers would have to take into account
that not all workers applying for the contract designed for the other type may get a job, as
the number of applications may exceed the number of jobs. This would weaken ICm, and
hence further reduce the rents that motivated workers obtain. Further, we also assume
that the public rm can commit not to renegotiate the contracts after the types have been
revealed, such that the ratchet e¤ect has no bite.
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would do in the private sector if they would be motivated to work in the
private sector, em > exm.
Intuitively, as in the standard adverse selection model, the public rm
makes the contract of the regular workers less attractive to motivated work-
ers by decreasing the level of e¤ort in that contract. Thereby, it can extract
a greater part of the rents from motivation from the motivated workers.
However, this decrease in e¤ort implies that the public rm needs to hire
more regular workers to meet the production constraint, which is costly. It
can decrease these costs by increasing the e¤ort of motivated workers. In
the optimum, the cost of an additional unit of e¤ort by giving stronger in-
centives to the motivated workers is equal to the cost of an additional unit
of e¤ort by hiring an additional regular worker.14
Next, consider the case where the public rm decides to attract moti-
vated and lazy workers, k = l. If the revelation constraint of motivated
workers ICm is binding, the optimisation problem of the public rm is sim-
ilar to that above, leading to rst-order conditions (12) and (13) with r = l.
Hence, the public rm distorts both contracts by giving lazy workers weaker
incentives than private rms do, and motivated workers stronger incentives
than private rms would.
Interestingly, however, when the public rm attracts lazy workers, it
is also possible that the revelation constraint does not bind, i.e. that the
contract for lazy workers is less appealing to motivated workers than working
in the private sector.15 In this case, IRm and IRl are binding, while ICm
and ICl are non-binding. Then, the optimisation problem of the public rm
is to minimise cost (10) with respect to em and el, subject to IRl, IRm,
and the production constraint (11). This gives the following two rst-order
conditions for em and el, respectively:
 Nm
el
[Ul + lC(el)] +Nm

mC
0(em)  mV 0(em)

= 0 (14)
14Allowing for part-time jobs in the private sector makes contract distortions less costly.
Regular workers would take a part-time job in the private sector alongside their public
sector job, thereby increasing their utility. Hence, the cost of the downward distortion for
the public rm is lower, implying that the rm can extract more rents from the motivated
workers.
15Note that this can never happen when the public rm hires regular workers rather
than lazy workers, since regular and motivated workers have the same outside option.
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
ellC
0(el)  Ul   lC(el)
 Q  emNm
e2l

= 0 (15)
By substituting el = el and using (4) and (5), we nd that the rst term
between brackets of rst-order condition (15) is zero. Hence, the public
rm sets the level of e¤ort for the lazy workers equal to their optimal level
of e¤ort in the private sector. Obviously, their wage must also be at the
same level as in the private sector. Substituting this result into rst-order
condition (14) gives em = exm. Hence, neither contract is distorted and the
contract o¤ered to motivated workers extracts all of their rents (as IRm is
binding).16
The nal step is to show which type of workers the public rm optimally
attracts in addition to the motivated workers. Let us start with the case
we just discussed, where the participation constraint of motivated workers
IRm is binding if the rm attracts lazy workers. The public rm pays p
per unit of e¤ort to lazy workers and extracts all of the motivational rents
from motivated workers. When, instead, the public rm attracts regular
workers, the revelation constraint of the motivated workers is always binding.
Therefore, the public rm can not extract all of the rents from motivation.
Moreover, it distorts the contract of the regular workers, implying that the
cost per unit of e¤ort of regular workers is greater than p. Hence, total cost
are lower if the public rm attracts lazy rather than regular workers.
Next, consider the case where the revelation constraint of motivated
workers ICm is binding if the public rm attracts lazy workers. In Appen-
dix A2, we prove that total cost Z decrease in the general work ethic of the
non-motivated worker type k, @Z=@k < 0. Hence, besides motivated work-
ers, the public rm prefers to attract the economys laziest workers. The
intuition is straightforward. The extraction of motivational rents from mo-
tivated workers by the public rm is hampered by the revelation constraint
for motivated workers ICm. To induce motivated workers to choose the
proper contract, they must receive all rents they would obtain by choosing
the other types contract. A contract satisfying a lazy workers participation
constraint has lower wage and lower required e¤ort than a contract satisfy-
ing a regular workers participation constraint. Therefore, a lazy workers
16 If the public rm could distinguish between worker types, contracts would not be
distorted, as only the participation constraints of the attracted worker types bind. The
public rm would then prefer to attract motivated workers, and would be indi¤erent
between lazy and regular workers.
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contract is less appealing to a motivated worker than a regular workers
contract, implying that the public rm can extract more rents, and hence
attracts motivated workers at lower cost, if it attracts lazy workers rather
than regular workers.17
It follows that the public rm can produce the same output at lower
cost by attracting lazy rather than regular workers. Moreover, the public
rm may deliberately provide weak incentives to lazy workers, implying that
lazy workers in the public sector exert less e¤ort than lazy workers who are
employed in the private sector. The laziness of civil servants may thus be a
sign of cost-e¢ cient government!
6 Social Welfare
In this section, we impose that the public rm maximises social welfare,
which we dene as the sum of utilities of all workers in the economy. Recall
that, so far, we ignored taxation as our assumption of lump-sum taxes im-
plies that none of the decisions by the workers or the cost-minimising public
rm are a¤ected by taxation. However, taxes do a¤ect workersutility and,
hence, social welfare. The total amount of taxes is simply the sum of the
wages of the public sector workers (Z). Since utility is linear in income,
social welfare can be written as:18
	 =
X
i
[(Ni   ni)Ui + niUi]  Z (16)
Recall that ni denotes the number of workers of type i 2 fr;m; lg hired by
the public rm. By using (3), the above expression can be rewritten to:
	 =
X
i
f(Ni   ni)Ui + ni [ iC(ei) + iV (ei)]g (17)
Hence, the public rm maximises total utility in the private sector minus
the net cost of e¤ort in the public sector.
17Without motivated workers, Nm = 0, it follows from rst-order condition (13) that the
government does not distort the contract of regular or lazy workers. Then, the government
is indi¤erent between lazy and regular workers, as both are willing to work in the public
sector for p per unit of e¤ort. Hence, the contract distortions and the preference for lazy
workers stem from the presence of motivated workers.
18Since the public rms output Q is xed, we can safely ignore the utility from public
goods in the optimisation problem.
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In Appendices A3 and A4, we prove that the optimal choice of the social
planner is identical to that of a cost-minimising public rm when e¤ort is
unveriable, and when e¤ort is veriable and Q is su¢ ciently small, respec-
tively. Thus, when e¤ort is unveriable, regular workers are least attractive
to the public rm, and lazy and motivated workers may both be the best
choice. When e¤ort is veriable and Q is su¢ ciently small, the public rm
attracts motivated workers, and induces them to exert a level of e¤ort smaller
than private rms do, em < em.
When e¤ort is veriable and Q is su¢ ciently large, social welfare (17)
can be rewritten as:
	 =
X
i
(NiU

i )  nk [Uk + kC(ek)] Nm [Um + mC(em)  mV (em)]
(18)
where subscript k 2 fr; lg denotes the non-motivated worker type the rm
hires. Maximising (18) with respect to em and ek, subject to production
constraint (11), yields the following rst-order conditions:
Nm
ek
[Uk + kC(ek)] Nm

mC
0(em)  mV 0(em)

= 0 (19)
Q Nmem
e2k

Uk + kC(ek)  ekkC 0(ek)

= 0 (20)
Using (4) and (5), it follows that rst-order condition (20) is zero for ek = ek.
Hence, the non-motivated worker type is induced to exert the same level of
e¤ort as in the private sector. This implies that the public rm is indi¤erent
between hiring lazy and regular workers, as both types need to be paid p
per unit of e¤ort. Substituting this result into rst-order condition (19), it
follows that the e¤ort of motivated workers is (implicitly) given by (6), the
level of e¤ort motivated workers would exert in the private sector if they
would derive utility from working there, em = exm. Hence, a social planner
does not distort the contracts of its employees. Wages are set such that the
participation constraints IRk and IRm and the revelation constraints ICk
and ICm are all satised.19
19Because utility is linear in income, the distribution of income does not a¤ect social
welfare. When the social welfare function is extended to allow for distributional concerns,
as in e.g. Boyer and La¤ont (2003, Section 6), the public rm may distort contracts.
Then, rent extraction from motivated workers may be considered optimal for distributive
reasons. Rent extraction may also be optimal when taxes are distortionary, as in e.g.
17
The social welfare maximising contracts di¤er from those o¤ered by the
cost-minimising public rm. This implies that, when the public rm max-
imises social welfare, social welfare is higher, but also that total cost and,
hence, taxes are higher. Apart from the di¤erence in taxes, lazy and reg-
ular workers attain the same level of utility, Ui , in both cases. Hence, as
taxes are higher, social welfare maximisation makes lazy and regular work-
ers worse o¤. It follows that only motivated workers benet from having a
social welfare maximising government. When motivated workers constitute
a minority in society, politicians are likely to act in the interest of lazy and
regular workers and strive for minimum cost of public goods production.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper has shown that, in addition to workers with a public service
motivation, the public sector may prefer to hire the economys laziest workers
and provide them with weaker incentives than the market sector does. Even
though this reduces aggregate welfare, a majority of society may be better
o¤, as motivated workers can be hired at lower wage, and hence public goods
are produced at lower cost. When e¤ort is to a large extent unveriable in
the public sector, the public sector may hire too many lazy workers as they
crowd out motivated workers.
We have restricted Q such that two worker types are su¢ cient. It is
a straightforward repetition of the analyses to allow for values of Q such
that the public rm needs all three worker types. When the di¤erence in
general work ethic  between lazy and regular workers is su¢ ciently large,
the contract for lazy workers is not distorted, whereas the public rm distorts
the contracts for motivated and regular workers. Otherwise, the contract for
lazy workers will be distorted as well. In the limit, when Q!1, the public
rm does not distort any contract, as can be seen from rst-order condition
(13). When the rm needs a great number of non-motivated workers, the
costs of distorting the contract for non-motivated workers are large compared
to the benets of rent extraction from the motivated workers.
We have abstracted from interactions between the workers. Work morale,
however, may be a¤ected by the behaviour of ones colleagues. The enthu-
La¤ont and Tirole (1993). Then, the social planner trades o¤ the ine¢ ciencies arising
from taxation against the ine¢ ciency of distorting the contracts of the workers in the
public sector.
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siasm of coworkers may be stimulating, whereas shirking colleagues may
reduce the incentive to work (Stowe, 2002). Likewise, motivated workers
may consider the wage paid to lazy workers to be unfair given the di¤erence
in e¤ort. Then, attracting lazy workers may be detrimental to the e¤ort
of motivated workers. Further, if the pace of production depends on the
weakest link, it may not be optimal to hire lazy workers.
A Appendices
A.1 Conditions under which hiring two types of workers is
optimal
Unveriable e¤ort
Because the public rm can not induce workers to exert a certain level of
e¤ort, it is necessary to attract a second worker type as soon as Q > Niei,
where i is the worker type the rm prefers to employ when Q is su¢ ciently
low. As argued in the main text, it might happen that the public rm can
not single out its most preferred type. Then, the public rm always employs
two worker types.
Veriable e¤ort, cost-minimisation
First, consider the case where the participation constraint of motivated
workers IRm binds when the public rm attracts lazy workers, while the
revelation constraint ICm is non-binding. Marginal cost of e¤ort when hiring
a lazy worker is p. This implies that the public rm hires lazy workers as soon
as the marginal cost of e¤ort of motivated workers exceeds p. Di¤erentiating
the participation constraint (7) of motivated workers with respect to em
gives:
@wm
@em
= mC
0(em)  mV 0(em) (A1)
Hence, the public rm attracts a second worker type when Q > Nme

m,
where em is dened by:
mC
0(em)  mV 0(em) = p (A2)
Note that (A2) is identical to (6). Hence, em = exm, which is the optimal
level of e¤ort motivated workers would exert in the private sector if they
would derive utility from working in the private sector.
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Next, consider the case where the revelation constraint of motivated
workers ICm binds when the public rm attracts lazy workers, while the
participation constraint IRm is non-binding. It is obvious that the public
rm attracts only motivated workers when Q  Nmem. Now consider higher
levels of Q. When the rm does not attract lazy workers, total cost can be
found by substituting the production constraint Q = Nmem and the partic-
ipation constraint (7) of motivated workers into total cost Z1 = Nmwm:
Z1 = Nm

Um + mC(
Q
Nm
)  mV (
Q
Nm
)

(A3)
It is easy to verify that Z1 is a continuous and convex function of Q. When,
instead, the public rm attracts both motivated and lazy workers, total
cost discontinuously increase, as the public rm can no longer extract all
motivational rents from the motivated workers. Suppose the public rm
would not distort the contracts of its workers, el = el and em = e

m (= exm).
Then, total cost when the public rm attracts both lazy and motivated
workers, Z2, is a linear function of Q , as the marginal cost of e¤ort equals
p. Hence, Z1 and Z2 intersect at some level of Q > Nme

m. Since the public
rm optimally distorts the contracts of its workers when it attracts both
lazy and motivated workers so as to decrease cost, the minimum level of Q
at which it is optimal to attract lazy workers is smaller than the level at
which Z1 and Z2 intersect.
Veriable e¤ort, social planner
As the social planner induces lazy and regular workers to exert the same
level of e¤ort as in the private sector, this case is similar to the case where
the participation constraint of motivated workers IRm binds when the cost-
minimising public rm attracts lazy workers.
A.2 Proof that @Z
@k
< 0
By substituting the production constraint (11), IRk, ICm, and (5) into total
cost (10), we nd:
Z = fpek   k[C(ek)  C(ek)]g

Q  emNm
ek
+Nm

+
Nmfm[C(em)  C(ek)]  m[V (em)  V (ek)]g
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A marginal increase in k leads to a decrease in Z:
@Z
@k
=  [C(ek)  C(ek)]

Q  emNm
ek
+Nm

< 0
where, by the envelop theorem, all e¤ects through ek, ek, and em are zero,
and the sign follows from ek < ek (see rst-order condition (13)).
A.3 Proof that cost-minimisation and welfare-maximisation
yield identical results when e¤ort is unveriable
A cost-minimising public rm attracts the worker type that minimises Z =
niwi. After substituting the production constraint ni = Q=ei and (7), we
nd that:
Z =
Q
ei
[Ui + iC(ei)  iV (ei)]
A welfare-maximising public rm attracts the worker type that maximises
(17). After substituting the production constraint ni = Q=ei, we nd that:
	 =
Q
ei
[ Ui   iC(ei) + iV (ei)]
Obviously, these two optimisation problems yield the same results.
A.4 Proof that cost-minimisation and welfare-maximisation
yield identical results when e¤ort is veriable and Q is
su¢ ciently small
A welfare-maximising public rm maximises (17) with respect to ei, subject
to the production constraint ni = Q=ei. This gives rst-order condition:
  iC 0(ei)  iV 0(ei)+ Ui + iC(ei)  iV (ei)ei

= 0
which is, except for opposite signs, identical to rst-order condition (9) de-
rived in Section 5. Hence, the optimal contract of a welfare-maximising
public rm is identical to that of a cost-minimising public rm.
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